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FOREWORD 
The Debris Team has developed and implemented measures to control damage from debris in the 
Shuttle operational environment and to make the control measures a part of routine launch flows. 
These measures include engineering surveillance during vehicle processing and closeout 
operations, facility and flight hardware inspections before and after launch, and photographic 
analysis of mission events. 
Photographic analyses of mission imagery from launch, on-orbit, and landing provide significant 
data in verifying proper operation of systems and evaluating anomalies. In addition to the 
Kennedy Space Center PhotoNideo Analysis, reports from Johnson Space Center and Marshall 
SI?a~e Flight Center are also included in this document to provide an integrated assessment of the 
mISSion. 
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1.0 SUMMARY 
A pre-launch debris inspection of the launch pad and Shuttle vehicle was performed on 18 
November 1996. The detailed walkdown of Pad 39B and MLP-3 also included the primary flight 
elements OV-I02 Columbia (21st flight) , ET-80 (LWT 73), and BI-084 SRB' s. There were no 
significant vehicle or pad anomalies. 
The vehicle was cryoloaded for flight on 19 November 1996. There were no Launch Commit 
Criteria (LCC), OMRS, or NSTS-08303 criteria violations. No IPR' s were taken. No acreage 
icing or frost conditions were expected due to the ambient conditions. There were no ice/frost 
conditions or protuberance icing conditions outside of the established data base. 
After the 2:55 p.m. (local) launch on 19 November 1996, a debris walk down of Pad 39B was 
performed. No flight hardware or TPS materials were found . AIl the T -0 umbilicals operated 
properly. Overall, damage to the launch pad was minimal. 
A total of 107 films and videos were analyzed as part of the post mission data review. No vehicle 
damage or lost flight hardware was observed that would have affected the mission. 
A stud hang-up occurred on holddown post #7. Two semi-circular objects, believed to be shaved 
pieces of aluminum from the aft skirt bore, fell aft into the SRB exhaust hole. A piece of 
ordnance debris, approximately one inch long, fell from the HDP #6 stud hole shortly after lift-off. 
No ordnance fragments or frangible nut pieces fell from any of the other DCS while in the field of 
view. No stud hang-ups or frangible nut/ordnance debris was observed on any of the other 
holddown posts. 
SRB separation from the External Tank and ET-80 separation from the Orbiter appeared normal. 
Four TPS divots were detected on intertank stringers: one forward of the -Y bipod ramp 
approximately IO-inches long and possibly showing primer; two between the bipods just forward 
of the splice closeout approximately 4-inches in length with one possibly showing a small area of 
primer; and one forward of the L02 feedline fairing near XT -930 approximately I5-inches long 
and showing stringer head primed substrate. A divot approximately 6-inches in diameter was 
visible in the LH2 tank-to-intertank flange closeout in the -Y+Z quadrant. The ET/SRB upper 
strut fairing splice plate closeouts using PDL-I034 foam (third flight) were intact but exhibited 
small "popcorn" type divots. Aft dome NCFI 24-57 exhibited charring and "popcorn" divoting 
similar to the previous flight. ET -80 was the second external tank flown that utilized the 141 B 
blowing agent in NCFI formulation. 
The Solid Rocket Boosters were inspected at Hanger AF after retrieval. Both frustums were in 
excellent condition. No MSA-2 debonds over acreage or fasteners were detected. 
Orbiter performance as viewed on landing films and videos during final approach, touchdown, and 
rollout was nominal. Drag chute operation was also normal. 
A post landing inspection ofOV-102 was conducted 7 December 1996 on SLF runway 33 at the 
Kennedy Space Center. The Orbiter TPS sustained a total of 93 hits, of which 8 had a major 
dimension of I-inch or larger. Based on these numbers and comparison to statistics from previous 
missions of similar configuration, both the total number of hits and the number of hits I-inch or 
larger was less than average. 
The Orbiter lower surface sustained a total of 34 hits, of which 4 had a major dimension of I-inch 
or larger. The largest lower surface tile damage site was located aft of the LH2 ET fORB umbilical 
and measured 3-inches long by 314-inch wide by I12-inch maximum depth. The damage was most 
likely caused by an ice impact from the umbilical. 
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ET/Orbiter separation devices EO-I , EO-2, and EO-3 functioned nonnally. No ordnance 
fragments were found on the runway beneath the umbilical cavities. AIl ET IOrbiter umbilical 
separation ordnance retention shutters were closed properly. 
Bent metal, approximately I-inch in length by 1I8-inch wide, was visible on the trailing edge of a 
shim between two bolt heads on the inside surface of the L02 ET door. The shim was located at 
the +X+Y comer of the door. A small piece of wire, 3/8-inch long by I/32-inch diameter, was 
wedged against a bolt head in this same general area. No reason for the damage or loose debris 
could be immediately detennined. It should be noted no similar shim is located on the LHZ ET 
door (mirror image). . 
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2.0 PRE-LAUNCH BRIEFING 
The DebrislIce/TPS and Photographic Analysis Team briefing for launch activities was conducted 
on 18 November 1996 at 1400 hours. The following personnel participated in various team 
activities, assisted in the collection and evaluation of data, and contributed to reports contained in 
this document. 
J. Tatum 
G. Katnik 
J. Lin 
R. Speece 
B. Bowen 
J. Rivera 
M. Bassignani 
B. Davis 
z. Byrns 
M. Valdivia 
R. Seale 
1. Blue 
W. Richards 
M . Wollam 
G. Fales 
K. Mayer 
W. Atkinson 
1. Cook 
1. Ramirez 
NASA - KSC Chief, ET/SRB Mechanical Systems 
NASA - KSC Shuttle IcefDebris Systems 
NASA - KSC Shuttle IcefDebris Systems 
NASA - KSC Thermal Protection Systems 
NASA - KSC Infrared Scanning Systems 
NASA - KSC ET Mechanisms/Structures 
NASA - KSC ET Mechanisms/Structures 
NASA - KSC Digital Imaging Systems 
NASA - KSC Level II Integration 
USA - SPC Supervisor, ET /SRB Mechanical Systems 
USA - SPC ET Mechanical Systems 
USA - SPC ET Mechanical Systems 
USA - SPC ET Mechanical Systems 
USA - SPC ET Mechanical Systems 
USA - SPC ET Mechanical Systems 
Rockwell LSS Systems Integration 
Rockwell LSS Systems Integration 
THIO - LSS SRM Processing 
LMSO - LSS ET Processing 
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3.0 LAUNCH 
STS-80 was launched at 96:324:19:55:46.990 UTC (2:55 p.m. local) on 19 November 1996. 
3.1 PRE-LAUNCH SSVIPAD DEBRIS INSPECTION 
A pre-launch debris inspection of the launch pad and Shuttle vehicle was performed on 18 
November 1996. The detailed walkdown of Pad 39B and MLP-3 also included the primary flight 
elements OV-I02 Columbia (21st flight) , ET-80 (LWT 73), and BI-084 SRB 's. There were no 
significant vehicle or launch pad anomalies. 
3.2 FINAL INSPECTION 
The Final Inspection of the cryoloaded vehicle was performed on 19 November 1996 from 1020 
to 1150 hours during the two hour built-in-hold at T -3 hours in the countdown. There were no 
Launch Commit Criteria (LCC), OMRS, or NSTS-08303 criteria violations. No Ice, Debris, or 
TPS IPR's were taken. No acreage icing or frost conditions were expected due to the afternoon 
launch time and favorable weather conditions. There were no protuberance icing conditions 
outside of the established data base. 
A portable Shuttle Thermal Imager (ST!) infrared scanning radiometer was utilized to obtain 
vehicle surface temperature measurements for an overall thermal assessment of the vehicle, 
particularly those areas not visible from remote fixed scanners, and to scan for unusual 
temperature gradients. 
3.2.1 ORBITER 
No Orbiter tile or RCC panel anomalies were observed. The RIU, R4D, L4D, and F4R RCS 
thruster covers were intact, but tinted green indicating small internal vapor leaks. Ice/frost and 
condensate had formed on SSME #1 and #2 heat shield-to-nozzle interfaces. Condensate was 
present on the SS:ME #3 heat shield-to-nozzle interface. An infrared scan revealed no unusual 
temperature gradients on the base heat shield or engine mounted heat shields. 
3.2.2 SOLID ROCKET BOOSTERS 
SRB case temperatures measured by the STr radiometers averaged 68-72 degrees F. 
Temperatures measured by the SRB Ground Environment Instrumentation (GEl) ranged from 
68-75 degrees F . All measured temperatures were above the 34 degrees F minimum requirement. 
The predicted Propellant Mean Bulk Temperature supplied by TIDO was 71 degrees F, which 
was within the required range of 44-86 degrees F . 
3.2.3 EXTERNAL TANK 
The ice/frost prediction computer program 'SURFICE' was run as a general companson to 
infrared scanner point measurements. The program predicted condensate with no ' ice/frost 
accumulation on the TPS acreage surfaces during cryoload. 
The Final Inspection. Team observed very light condensate, but no ice or frost accumulations, on 
the L02 tank. TPS surface temperatures ranged from 61-64 degrees F. A bungee cord from the 
southwest GOX vent seal, contacting the nose cone TPS early in the cryoload, left a I-inch long 
by V4-inch wide discoloration, but no apparent abrasion. 
The intertank acreage exhibited no TPS anomalies. Ice/frost accumulation on the GUCP appeared 
typical even with the leak detected during cryoload. 
The Final Inspection Team obse.rved very light condensate, but no ice or frost accumulations, on 
the LH2 tank. TPS surface temperatures ranged from 53-63 degrees F. 
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Photo 2: STS-80 Cryoloaded for Launch 
OV-I02 Columbia (21st flight) , ET-80 (LWT 73), and 81-084 SRB ' s 
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Photo 3: Overall View of ME's 
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Photo 4: ILT L02 Tank and lntertank 
Very light condensate, but no ice or frost accumulat ions, was observed on the L02 tank. TPS 
surface temperatures ranged from 6\-64 degrees F. The intertank acreage exhibited no IPS 
anomalies. 
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Photo 5: euep 
Ice/frost accumulation on the GUep appeared typical even with the leak detected during 
cryoload. 
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Photo 6: ET LH2 Tank 
Very light condensate, but no ice or frost accumulations, was observed on the LH2 tank . IPS 
surface temperatures ranged from 53-63 degrees F. 
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Typical amounts of ice/frost had accumulated in the L02 feedline bellows and support brackets. 
An II-inch long by V4-inch wide stress relief crack had formed on the -Y vertical strut forward 
facing TPS. The presence of the crack was expected and acceptable for flight per the NSTS-
08303 criteria. 
There were no TPS anomalies on the L02 ET/ORB umbilical. Ice/frost fingers on the separation 
bolt pyrotechnic canister purge vents were typical. 
Ice and frost in the LH2 recirculation line bellows and on both burst disks was typical. The LH2 
feedline bellows were wet with condensate. 
Less than usual amounts of ice/frost had accumulated on the LH2 ET /ORB umbilical purge 
barrier top and outboard sides. Typical ice/frost fingers were present on the pyro canister and 
plate gap purge vents. No unusual vapors or cryogenic drips had appeared during tanking, stable 
replenish, and launch. 
3.2.4 FACILITY 
All SRB sound suppression water troughs were filled and properly configured for launch. 
During launch countdown, a leak was reported in the GUCP. Postflight analysis of the GUCP 
showed that the leak was caused by low compression loads in the 7 -inch quick disconnect 
bellows. There were no visible signs of leaks, unusual vapors, or ice buildup detected during the 
final inspection. 
No leaks were observed on the L02 and LH2 Orbiter T -0 umbilicals. 
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4.0 POST LAUNCH PAD DEBRIS INSPECTION 
The post launch inspection of the MLP, FSS, RSS, and Pad B crawlerway/acreage was conducted 
on 19 November 1996 for 1.5 hours starting at Launch + 1.5 hours. 
No flight hardware or TPS materials were found . 
South SRB holddown post and shoe erosion was typical. All south HOP shoe shim material was 
intact. No externally visible evidence of a HDP stud hang-up was found . But based on vehicle 
liftoff lateral acceleration of O.26g's reported by Rockwell-Downey, a stud hand-up did likely 
occur. A stud hang-up on HDP #7 was later confirmed during post-launch film review. All of the 
north HOP doghouse blast covers were in the closed position. Erosion of the blast covers was 
typical . 
The Tail Service Masts (TSM), Orbiter Access Arm (OAA) and GOX Vent 'Arm (GVA) had no 
visible indications of damage. Both TSM bonnets closed properly. 
The Gill vent line was latched in the seventh of eight teeth of the latching mechanism. The ET 
GUCP had been struck by the retract lanyard as indicated by bright raised metal on the housing. 
Damage to the GUCP was minimal. The raised metal was in the peripheral seal gap at the bottom 
of the GUCP housing. The sealing surface of the 7 -inch Gill Vent QID was not damaged. There 
was no indication of the source of the Gill leak reported during the launch countdown. 
A piece of SRB throat plug, with RTV attached, measuring 6 inches by 12 inches by 12 inches 
was found on the roadway to the pad surface. 
Two broken ceramic insulators from an OTV camera cable was found on the southeast comer of 
the FSS 195 foot level 
Overall, damage to the pad appeared to be minimal. 
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5.0 FILM REVIEW 
Anomalies observed in the Film Review were presented to the Mission Management Team, 
Shuttle managers, and vehicle systems engineers. No IPRls or IFA's were generated as a result of 
the film review. 
5.1 LAUNCH FILM AND VIDEO SUMMARY 
A total of 83 films and videos, which included twenty-seven 16mm films, eighteen 35mm films, 
and thirty-eight videos, were reviewed starting on launch day. 
A cold wall leak occurred on SSME #2 (-Z side near the #9 hatband) after the Mach diamond had 
formed 19:55::44.5 UTC (E-l, -5, -16). Otherwise, SSME ignition appeared normal (OTV 151 , 
163, 170, 171 , TV-4; E-76). 
Pieces of tile surface coating material were lost from two places on the base heat shield outboard 
of SSME #3, four places on the base heat shield between SSME #1 and #3, and two places on the 
right APCS pod aft surface (E-17, -19). 
SSME ignition caused pieces of ice to fall from the ET/ORB umbilicals. Several pieces of ice 
contacted the LH2 umbilical cavity sill and were deflected outward. No tile damage was visible. 
No unusual vapors or cryogenic drips were visible.(OTV 109, 141 , 154, 163). 
A debris-induced streak occurred in the SSME #2 plume at 19:55:46.6 UTC (E-20). 
The Orbiter LH2 and L02 T -0 umbilicals disconnected and retracted properly (OTV 149, 150, 
170, 171). A 3-inch long by I-inch wide rectangular object, possibly an umbilical shim, fell aft 
during LH2 T -0 disconnect. The object did not contact flight hardware (E-18). 
GUCP disconnect from the ET was nominal (OTV 141 , 160). A typical amount of frost, but no 
TPS damage, was visible around the lower half of the ET umbilical carrier plate (E-33). 
A stud hang-up occurred on holddown post #7. The stud remained fully extended until the aft 
skirt cleared, then twanged briefly before falling into the holddown post. Two semi-circular 
objects, believed to be shaved pieces of aluminum from the aft skirt bore, appeared to fall aft into 
the SRB exhaust hole. No ordnance fragments or frangible nut pieces fell from the DCS while in 
the field of view (E-ll). Analysis of film item E-ll showed the stud rising 8.3 inches above the 
holddown post shoe before falling back into the holddown post (Figure 1). 
No stud hang-ups or frangible nut/ordnance debris was observed on any of the other holddown 
posts with the exception of HDP #6. An ordnance fragment, approximately I-inch long, fell from 
the stud hole shortly after liftoff (E-13). 
A piece of holddown post shoe shim or putty may have adhered to the right aft skirt #2 foot 
momentarily at T -0 before falling back onto the shoe (E-8). 
A piece of thermal curtain tape (near HDP #7) came loose at liftoff (E-16). 
Outgassing and charring of ET aft dome NCFI was occurring as the vehicle cleared the tower 
(E-40, -52, -224). 
At least 11 small, light-colored particles, believed to be pieces of instafoam, originated from the 
RH SRB aft skirt area shortly after the roll maneuver and fell aft along the SRB plume (E-57). 
Body flap movement (amplitude and frequency) was clearly visible in film item E-212. 
13 
Photo 7: Base Heat Shield Tile Damage 
Pieces of tile surface coating material were lost frol11 four places on the base heat hield between 
SSME #1 and #3 .. 
14 
Photo 8: SSME #2 Cold Wall Leak 
A cold wall leak occurred on SSME #2 (-Z side near the #9 hatband) after the Mach diamond had 
formed . 
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'Photo 9: Holddown Post #7 Stud Hang- Up 
A stud hang-up occurred on holddown post #7. The stud remained fully extended until the aft 
skirt cleared, then twanged briefly before fa ll ing into the holddown post . Two semi-circular 
objects, believed to be shaved pieces of aluminum from the aft skiI1 bore, appeared to fall aft into 
the SRB exhaust hole. 
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Local flow condensation collars at various points on the vehicle were observed during ascent 
(E-223). 
Exhaust plume recirculation, though more visible on this launch due to a variety of factors 
including lighting conditions, vehicle attitude, and camera positions, did not appear anomalous 
(TVA, 13 ; E-205, -208). 
SRB separation appeared normal. Slag fell from the exhaust plumes during and after separation 
(TV-13 ; E-205, -208, -212). 
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5.2 ON-ORBIT FILM AND VIDEO SUMMARY 
OV -102 was equipped to carry umbilical cameras: 16mm motion picture with 5 nun lens; 16nun 
motion picture with 10mm lens; 3 Smm still views. The + X translation was not performed on this 
flight. Handheld photography by the flight crew consisted of nine still 3 Smm images. 
SRB separation from the External Tank appeared nominal. 
ET -80 separation from the Orbiter also appeared normal. 
Four TPS divots were detected on intertank stringers: one forward of the -Y bipod ramp 
approximately 10-inches long and possibly showing primer; two between the bipods just forward . 
of the splice closeout approximately 4-inches in length with one possibly showing a small area of 
primer; and one forward of the L02 feedline fairing near XT-930 approximately IS-inches long 
and showing stringer head primed substrate. 
The new method bipod jack pad standoff closeouts were . intact and undamaged. A divot 
approximately 6-inches in diameter was visible in the LH2 tank-to-intertank flange closeout in the 
-Y+Z quadrant. 
TPS erosion on L02 feedline flanges and support bracket ramps, pressurization line ramps, and 
both thrust strut flange closeouts was typical. 
Four shallow divots 2-3 inches in diameter were observed on the +Y vertical strut outboard 
surface. 
The ET/SRB upper strut fairing splice plate closeouts using PDL-I034 foam (third flight) were 
intact but exhibited small "popcorn" type divots. 
A dark, relatively smooth, circular area approximately 5-inches in diameter on the -Y vertical strut 
aft surface appeared different than the adjacent charred and rough-textured BX-2S0. Shadow 
lengths indicate this circular feature is probably no greater than O.S-inches deep and most likely 
did not expose the underlying ablator. 
The LH2 ET/ORB umbilical appeared to be in good condition after separation with no TPS 
damage. Frozen hydrogen adhered to the 17-inch disconnect and parts of the separation interface. 
Typically, foam had eroded from the horizontal (clamshell) section of the cable tray and the LH2 
feedline support arm. 
The L02 ET/ORB umbilical sustained TPS damage during separation at the forward outboard 
comer. Two pieces of loose foam were visible in that area. Part of the R TV purge barrier was 
detached at the 2:00 o'clock position. Minor TPS damage also occurred on the umbilical aft 
surface near the electrical monoball . Numerous divots and eroded areas were visible on the 
horizontal and vertical sections of the cable tray. Lightning contact strips across the forward part 
of the umbilical and at the 8:00 o 'clock position were missing. Loss oflightning contact strips has 
been the subject of previous IF A' s. 
Aft dome NCFI 24-57 exhibited charring and "popcorn" divoting similar to the previous flight 
(second flight with usage of the 141B blowing agent in NCFI formulation) . 
19 
Photo 10: SRB Sepa"ation 
SRB separation from the External Tank appeared nominal 
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Photo 11: ET lntertank TPS Divots 
Four TPS divots were detected on intertank stringers: one forward of the -Y bipod ramp 
approximately 10-inches long and possibly showing primer; two between the bipods just forward 
of the splice closeout approximately 4-inches in length with one possibly showing a small area of 
primer; and one forward of the L02 feedline fairing near XT-930 approximately IS-inches long 
and showing stringer head primed substrate. 
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Photo 12: ET/ORB LH2 Umbilical 
The LH2 ETIORB umbilical appeared to be in good condition after separation with no TPS 
damage. Frozen hyd rogen adhered to the 17-inch disconnect and paf1s of the eparation interface 
(I) . Typically, foam had eroded from the horizontal (clamshell ) section of the cable tray and the 
LH2 feed line support arm (2) . A piece of foam, most likely from the L02 umbilical forward face, 
was visib le near the LH2 umbilical (3) . 
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Photo 13: ET/ORB L02 Umbilical 
The L02 ETIORB umbilical sustained TPS damage during separation at the forward outboard 
corner_ Two pieces ofloo e foam were visible in that area (I), Part of the RTV purge barrier was 
detached at the 2:00 o'clock position (2) , Minor TPS damage also occurred on the umbilical aft 
surface near the electrical monoball (3) , Numerous divots and eroded areas were visib le on the 
horizontal and vertical sections of the cable tray (4), Lightning contact strips across the forward 
part of the umbilical (5) and at the 8:00 o'clock position were missing (6)_ Four shallow di vot 2-
3 inches in diameter were observed on the +Y vertical strut outboard surface (7) . 
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5.3 LANDING FILM AND VIDEO SUMMARY 
A total of 21 films and videos, which included nine 35mm large format films, two 16mm hi
gh 
speed films, and ten videos, were reviewed. The films were generally dark due to the pre-da
wn 
lighting conditions. 
The landing gear extended properly. The infrared scanners showed no debris falling from 
the 
Orbiter during final approach. Left and right main landing gear touchdown was virtu
ally 
simultaneous at approximately 3,000 feet from the runway threshold. The Orbiter stayed close
 to 
the runway centerline during rollout. 
Drag chute deployment appeared nominal. 
Touchdown of the nose landing gear was smooth. Rollout and wheel stop were uneventful. 
No significant TPS damage was visible in the films . 
24 
6.0 SRB POST FLIGHTIRETRIEVAL DEBRIS ASSESSMENT 
The BI-084 Solid Rocket Boosters were inspected for debris damage and debris sources at 
CCAFS Hangar AF on 21-22 November 1996. From a debris standpoint, both SRB' s were in 
excellent condition. 
Both frustums were in excellent condition. No TPS was missing. No MSA-2 debonds over 
acreage or fasteners were detected. Hypalon paint, usually blistered/missing along the XB-395 
ring frames, was intact and virtually unscorched. The only blistered Hypalon paint was located on 
the left frustum in a band between the XB-318 and XB-336 ring frames from the -Z to the +Z 
axes; and between the XB-3S2 and XB-367 ring frames generally aft of the BSM's. All eight 
BSM aero heat shield covers were undamaged and locked in the fully opened position. 
The forward skirts exhibited no debonds or missing TPS. RSS antennae covers/phenolic base 
plates were intact though some of the phenolic layers had delaminated. Hypalon paint was 
blistered/missing over the areas where BT A closeouts had been applied. A pin and retainer clip 
were missing from the right frustum severance ring at approximately 90 degrees. The pin and clip 
may have been lost after water impact due to parachute riser entanglement 
The Field Joint Protection System (FJPS) closeouts were generally in good condition. Trailing 
edge damage to the FJPS and the GEl cork runs were attributed to debris resulting from 
severance of the nozzle extension. 
Separation of the aft ET/SRB struts appeared normaL Water impact deformed the right SRB 
upper strut fairing . Cork insulation was missing from an area approximately 6-inches long by 
4-inches wide on the aft side. The exposed, primed substrate was clean and may indicate the 
insulation had not adhered. The ETA ring, lEA, and IEA covers appeared undamaged from 
splashdown though the protective foam was debonded or missing in many areas. 
TPS on the external surface of both aft skirts was intact and in good condition. Internally, foam 
was missing and substrate exposed on the right aft skirt aft ring. 
A stud hang-up occurred on HDP #7 and the hole was broached. The stud hang-up was 
confirmed in the launch film review on film item E-11 . Stud hang-ups have occurred on 6 of the 
last 9 launches (STS-72 through STS-80). Prior to this interval, no stud hang-ups occurred for 19 
consecutive launches (STS-53 through STS-71). 
The HDP #5 and #6 debris plungers were fully extended, but slightly skewed and not completely 
seated. A piece of ordnance debris, approximately one inch long, fell from the HDP #6 stud hole 
shortly after liftoff (film item E-13). The remaining HDP Debris Containment Systems (DCS) 
plungers were seated and appeared to have functioned normally. 
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Photo t 4: RH Frustum 
The righthand frustum was in excellent condi tion . No TPS was missing. No M A-2 debonds over 
acreage or fasteners were detected 
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Photo 15: RH Forwa.-d Skirt 
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Photo 16: RH Aft Booster/Aft Skirt 
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Photo 17: LH Frustum 
Hypa\on paint was blistered in a band between the XB-3\S and XB-" 36 ring tl"ames from the -Z 
to the +Z axes; and between the XB-3S2 and XB-367 ring frames generally aft of the B M' . 
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Photo 18: LH Forward kil"t 
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Photo 19: LH Aft Booster/Aft ki,-t 
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Photo 20: HOP #7 tud Hole Broaching 
A stud hang-up occurred on I-IDP #7 and the hole wa broached. The stud hang-up was 
confirmed in the launch film review on fi lm item E-I I . 
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7.0 ORBITER POST LANDING DEBRIS ASSESSMENT 
A post landing inspection of OV-102 Columbia was conducted 7-8 December 1996 at the 
Kennedy Space Center on SLF runway 33 and in the Orbiter Processing Facility bay #1. This 
inspection was performed to identify debris impact damage and, if possible, debris sources. The 
Orbiter TPS sustained a total of 93 hits, of which 8 had a major dimension of I-inch or larger. 
This total does not include the numerous hits on the base heat shield attributed to SSME 
vibration/acoustics and exhaust plume recirculation. A comparison of these numbers to statistics 
from 64 previous missions of similar configuration (excluding missions STS-23 , 24, 25, 26, 26R, 
27R, 30R, and 42, which had damage from known debris sources), indicates both the total 
number of hits and the number of hits I-inch or larger were less than average (Reference attached 
figures . No debris impacts were noted on both the left and right sides of the Orbiter, so the 
corresponding figures have been omitted). 
The following table breaks down the STS-80 Orbiter debris damage by area: 
HITS > I" TOTALIDTS 
Lower surface 4 34 
Upper surface 4 54 
Right side 0 0 
Left side 0 0 
Right OMS Pod 0 2 
Left OMS Pod 0 3 
TOTALS 8 93 
The largest lower surface tile damage site was located aft of the LH2 ET IORB umbilical and 
measured 3-inches long by 314-inch wide by I12-inch maximum depth. The damage was most 
likely caused by an ice impact from the umbilical. 
Tile damage sites aft of the LH2 and L02 ET/ORB umbilicals were otherwise typical in number 
and size. The damage was most likely caused by impacts from umbilical ice or shredded pieces of 
umbilical purge barrier material flapping in the airstream. 
No tile damage from micrometeorites or on-orbit debris was identified during this inspection. 
The tires and brakes were reported to be in average condition for a landing on the KSC concrete 
runway. Ply undercutting occurred on the LH main inboard tire. 
ET/Orbiter separation devices EO-I , EO-2, and EO-3 functioned normally. No ordnance 
fragments were found on the runway beneath the umbilical cavities. Virtually no umbilical 
closeout foam or white R TV dam material adhered to the umbilical plate near the LH2 
recirculation line disconnect. However, loose pieces of white RTV hung from two of the three 
umbilical pyro separation devices. 
Bent metal, approximately I-inch in length by lI8-inch wide, was visible on the trailing edge of a 
shim between two bolt heads on the inside surface of the L02 ET door. The shim was located at 
the +X+Y corner of the door. A small piece of wire, 3/8-inch long by 1/32-inch diameter, was 
wedged against a bolt head in this same general area. No reason for the damage or loose debris 
could be immediately determined. It should be noted no similar shim is located on the LH2 ET 
door (mirror image). 
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All three SSME Dome Mounted Heat Shield (DMHS) closeout blankets sustained some damage. 
The SSME #1 blanket was torn/frayed at the 5:00-6:00 o' clock position. Some of the batting 
material may be missing. The SSME #2 blanket was torn/frayed at the 12:00-1:00 and 4:00-5 :00 
o 'clock positions, but no material appeared to be missing. The SSME #3 blanket at the 9:00 
0 ' clock position was slightly frayed at the outboard edge. 
A cluster of seven tiles on the base heat shield between SSME #1 and #3 sustained greater than 
nonnal damage, which may have been the result of debris impacts rather than plume recirculation 
effects. The tiles were missing a large percentage of surface area with the average depth 
measuring V4-inch. 
No ice adhered to the payload bay door. The reddish-brown discoloration on the leading edge of 
the LH payload bay door had not changed in appearance. No unusual tile damage occurred on the 
leading edges of the vertical stabilizer and OMS pods. 
Hazing and streaking of Orbiter windows #2, #3 , #4 and #5 appeared to be less than usual. 
Damage sites on the window perimeter tiles (10 hits on window #2, 7 hits on #3 , 6 hits on #4, and 
11 hits on #5) were attributed to impacts from the FRCS thruster paper coverslRTV adhesive. 
The post landing walkdown of Runway 33 was perfonned immediately after landing. No debris 
concerns were identified. All drag chute hardware was recovered and appeared to have functioned 
nonnally. 
In summary, both the total number of Orbiter TPS debris hits and the number of hits I-inch or 
larger were less than average when compared to previous missions. 
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Figure 2: Orbiter Lower Surface Debris Map 
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Figure 3: Orbiter Upper Surface Debris Map 
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Photo 2 t : Overall View of Ol-biter Left ide 
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Photo 22: Overall View of Orbiter Right Side 
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Photo 23: Overall View of Orbiter No e 
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Photo 24: Overall View of Orbiter SM E's and Base Heat hield 
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Photo 25: Lower Surface Tile Damage 
The largest lower surface tile damage site was located aft of the LH2 ET/O RB umbilical and 
measured 3-inches long by 314-inch wide by II2-i nch maximum depth . The damage wa most 
likely caused by an ice impact from the umbilical. 
42 
r- - ,----'--
Photo 26: ET/ORB LH2 Umbilical 
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Photo 27: ET/ORB L02 Umbilical 
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Photo 28: Bent Metal on L02 ET Door 
Bent metal, approximately I-inch in length by 1/8-inch, was visible on the trailing edge of a him 
between two bolt heads on the in ide urface of the ET L02 door. The shim was located at the 
+ X + Y corner of the door. 
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Photo 29: L02ET 0001" Loose Debl"is 
A small piece of wire, 3/8-inch long by 1/32-inch diameter, wa wedged against a bolt head in the 
+ X + Y corner of the door. 
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Photo 30: Base Heat Shield Tile Damage 
A cluster of seven tiles on the base heat shield between SSME # I and #3 sustained greater than 
normal damage, which may have been the result of debris impacts rather than plu me recirculation 
effects. The tiles were missing a large percentage of surface area with the average depth 
measuring 1/4-inch. This damage was observed during liftoff in the postiaunch film review. 
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Photo 31: Orbiter Windows 1-3 
Photo 32: Orbiter Windows 4-6 
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1. STS-80 (OV-I02): FilmlVideo Screening and Timing Summary 
1. S1'S-80 (OV-102): FILM I VIDEO SCREENING AND TIMING 
SUMMARY 
1.1 SCREENING ACTIVITIES 
1.1.1 Launch 
The STS-80 launch of Columbia (OV-102) from pad B occurred on Tuesday, 
November 19, 1996, (day 324) 19:55:47.160 Coordinated Universal Time (UTC) 
as seen on camera OTVI50. Solid Rocket Booster (SRB) separation occurred at 
19:57:50.994 UTC as seen on camera KTVI3. 
On launch day, 23 of 24 expected videos were received and screened. OTV 148 
was not received. Following launch day, 21 films were screened. Additional 
films were received but were not screened due to FY97 budget constraints. A bolt 
hang-up was seen at the LSRB holddown post M-7 at liftoff. 
Detailed Test Objective 312, was performed using the Orbiter umbilical well 
cameras (method 1) and handheld photography (method 3). Photography of the 
LSRB separation and the external tank (ET) separation was acquired. Handheld 
photography of the ET was acquired using the Nikon F4 camera with the 300 rom 
lens and 2x converter (method 3) . 
1.1.2 On-Orbit 
Video analysis support was provided to the investigation of the STS-80 airlock 
hatch anomaly. See section 2.5.1. 
1.1.3 Landing 
Columbia landed on runway 33 at the KSC Shuttle Landing Facility on December 
7, 1996. Eleven videos were received and screened. Following landing, nine 
films were screened. 
No major anomalies were noted in the approach, landing, or roll-out video and 
film views screened. The drag chute deployment appeared normal. 
1.1.4 Post Landing 
After landing, imagery of the ET/Orbiter LH2 umbilical acquired during SSME 
ignition through liftoff were reviewed for indications of hydrogen leaks. This 
imagery review was conducted at the request of the JSC Propulsion and Power 
Division I EP to support the Shuttle Program investigation of the higher than 
normal hydrogen values measured at the aft end of the vehicle just prior to liftoff. 
The Orbiter umbilical well camera films of the external tank LH2 umbilical were 
also studied for indications of hydrogen leaks in support of this investigation. No 
visual indications of hydrogen leaking were found. 
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1. STS-80 (OV-I02): FilmNideo Screening and Timing Summary 
1.2 TIMING ACTIVITIES 
The time codes from videos and films were used to identify specific events during 
the initial screening process. 
The landing and drag chute event times are provided in Table 1.2. 
Event Description Time (UTC) Camera 
Landing Gear - Doors Opened 342: 11 :48:42.068 KTV6L 
Left Main Wheel Touchdown 342: 11:49:03 .823 KTV6L 
Right Main Wheel Touchdown 342: 11 :49:04.056 KTV6L 
Drag Chute Initiation 342: 11 :49:07.960 KTV6L 
Pilot Chute at Full Inflation 342: 11 :49:08.839 KTV33L 
Bag Release 342: 11 :49:09.507 KTV33L 
Drag Chute Inflation in Reefed 342: 11 :49: 10.508 KTV33L 
Configuration 
Drag Chute Inflation in Dis- 342: 11 :49: 13.911 KTV33L 
reefed Configuration 
Nose Wheel Touchdown 342: 11 :49: 16.514 KTV6L 
Drag Chute Release 342: 11 :49:40.071 KTV33L 
Wheel Stop 342: 11 :50:05.953 KTV15L 
Table 1.2 Landing Video Timing Events 
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2. ummary of ignificant Event 
2. UMMARY OF IGNIFIC T EVE T 
2.1 DEBRI 
A on previou rru sJOns mUltiple piece of debri were een near the time of 
ME ignition, at the time of RB ignition, and aft of the launch vehicle after 
liftoff. Mo t of the debri were umbilical ice and RCS paper. 0 damage to the 
vehicle was noted. 0 follow-up action wa reque ted. 
Figure 2.1 (A) Debri Striking LH2 Umbilical Electric able Tray 
Multiple pieces of ice debri were een falli ng from the ET/Orbiter umbilical 
during SSME ignition. Ice debri was een to strike the LH2 electric cable tray 
(19:55:43.056 UTC) and the LH2 umbilical well door ill (19:55:43.390, 
19:55:44.324, and 19:55:45.158 UTC). Ice debris was een to strik the L02 
umbilical electric cable tray during SSME ignition (19:55:42.489, 19:55:43.857, 
and 19:55:44.458 UTC) . one of the debris seen to contact the vehicle appeared 
to cause damage. (Camera OT 109, OTV154 ) 
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2. Summary of ignificant Events 
Figure 2.1 (B ) Dark Debri t Liftoff 
Several piece of dark appearing debri were een at SSME ignition. A dark 
piece of deb ri was seen falling aft along the vehicle during liftoff. A ingle piece 
of debri was een crossing the left wing leading edge during liftoff. All of the e 
objects were probably birds. one of the object were seen to contact the vehicle. 
(Cameras OTV161 , OTV163) 
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Figure 2. I (C) Red Colored Debri Near Body Flap 
A ingle, mall , rectangular, red colored piece of debris was ' een falling along the 
body flap ju t prior to SRB ignition (19:55:46.666 UTC). This debris may have 
been a tile him or gap fil ler. (Camera E18) 
Multiple piece of debris from the RB flame trench area (possibly RB throat 
plug material) were seen north of the launch vehicle at liftoff. Debri ' north of the 
launch vehicle at liftoff has been seen on pr iou ' mission ' . t the 'ame time, <.l 
piece of debri s was seen fal ling a long the north side of the F S (19:55:47. UT ). 
The 'e debris pi ces were not 'een to contact the vehicle. (Camera E52) 
Multiple piece of debris (probably umbilical ice and RC paper) fell aft of the 
launch vehicle from liftoff through the roll maneuver. A single piece of light 
colored debris wa seen between the SRBs du rin g ascent ( 19:56:04.255 UTC) , 
(Camera E52, ES4, E63, E212, E223) 
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Figure 2. 1 (E) DebrIS ear Body Flap During scent 
A ingle light co lored piec of debris (probably umbilical purge barrier material ) 
wa ' een near the body flap during ascent ( 19:56:36.052 TC). This debris did 
not appear to contact the launch vehicl . (Camera KTV 13 , ET20 ) 
2.2 MOBILE LAUNCH PLATFORM (MLP) EVENTS 
The 55MB Mach diamond formation occu rred in the expected sequence. The 
time of the Mach diamond fo rmatio n were (Camera E76): 
SSME #3 - 19:55:43.727UTC 
SSME #2 - 19:55 :43.757UTC 
SSME # 1 - L9 :55:43.867UTC 
A IO 
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Figure 2.2 (A) Orange Vapor een During SSME Ignition 
Orange vapor, probably free burning hydrogen , was seen above the SSME rims , 
near the body flap , and near the bas of the vertical tabilizer during SSME 
ignition (19:55:41.3 UTC). Orange vapor have been 'een on previou 1111 Ions. 
(Camera ' OTV163 , OTV171 , E2, E4, E5 , 17, E19, E20, E63 , E76) 
t t 
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Figure 2.2 (B) White reas On Base Heat hi ld 
A whi te line (probably frost) wa 'een at the ba e of SME #2 at the j unctu re of 
the engine mounted heat hield-to-nozzl in terface at liftoff. Accumulations of 
ice/fro t on the heat hield-to-nozzle interface have been seen on previous 
mis ion . A mall white area wa al 0 een on the ba e heat hield near the 
inboard ide of the right RCS stinger (mi sing tile urface coating material) . 
(Cameras El8 , E19, E20) 
Three mall areas of base heat hie ld TPS tile urface ero ion were een near the 
base of SSME #3 during 55MB ignition . Two additional area of base heat shield 
ero ion were een near the left OMS nozzle at approximately the ame time. On 
camera E20, TPS erosion on the base heat hield was vi ible outboard of SSME 
#2. Ero ion of ba e heat hield ti le urface materi al ha been typically een on 
prev ious miss ion ' . (Camera E 17, E20) 
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Figure 2.2 (C) Bolt Hang-Up At Holddown Post M-7 
A bolt hang-up wa een at the LSRB holddown post M-7 at Liftoff (09 :54:59.594 
UTC). Debri fragments were een near the DCS during the hang-up and bolt relea e. 
SRB holddown bolt hang-up have been seen on six of the last eight previous 
missions. See Table 2.2. 0 fo llow-up action was reque ted. (Camera Ell ) 
MISSION LOCATION OF HANG-UP 
STS -34 RSRB holddown post M-2 
STS-33 RSRB holddown post M-3 
STS-39 RSRB holddown post M-I 
STS-43 LSRB holddown post M-7 
STS-45 RSRB holddown post M-4 
STS-50 RSRB holddown post M-4 
STS-46 LSRB holddown post M-7 
STS -S3 RSRB holddown post M- l 
STS-73 RSRB holddown post M-2 
STS-75 LSRB holddown post M-5 
STS-76 LSRB holddown post M-5 
STS-78 LSRB holddown post M-5 
STS-79 RSRB holddown post M-3 
STS-80 LSRB holddown post M-7 
Table 2.2 SRB Holddown Po t Bolt Hang-Up Seen On Previous Missions 
13 
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2.3 A CENT EVENTS 
n orange colored flare wa. seen in the SSME exhaust plume prior to the roll 
maneuver at 19:5S:SS.8 17 UTC (camera ES2) . On camera E212, th ree flares 
were seen in the SSME exhaust plume at approxi mately 19:56: 16, 19:56:31.9, and 
19:56:32 UTe. On Camera E212 and E222, a Ingle piece of debris, first seen 
near the RSRB aft kirt , contacted the SSME exhaust plume re ulting in an orange 
colored flare (19:S6:28 .7 UTC). Flare in the SSME exhaust plumes have been 
een on previous mis ion. (Cameras ES2, E212, E222) 
Figure 2.3 (A) Recirculation At Aft End Of Vehicle 
Recirculation, or the expansion of burning gas e at the aft end of the vehicle, was 
een during ascent (19:S7:20 - 19:57 :37 UTC). Recirculation during thi time 
period has been seen on previous miss ions. (Cameras KTV 13, ET204) 
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Figure 2.3 (B) Dark Puff In SRB Exhaust Plume 
A dark puff wa een in the SRB e hall t plume at 11.1 seconds prior to SRB 
eparation (19:57:39.8 UTC). (Cameras KTV4B, ET204) 
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2.4 ONBOARD PHOTOGRAPHY OF THE EXTERNAL TANK (DTO-312) 
2.4.1 naly i of the Umbilical Well Camera Films (Task #2) 
Thr roll of STS-80 umbi lical well camera film were acquired: the 16mm film 
(5mm lens), the 16mm fi lm ( lOmm lens) from the LH2 umbilical , and the 35mm 
film from the L02 umbilical. 
Sixty-five image of the external tank were acq uired with the 35mm umbilical 
well camera. The nose of the ET wa not imaged on the 35mm umbilical film 
because the +X translation was not performed. 
Figure 2.4.1 (A) ET Intertank 
Th.ree divot on the intertank stringers on th +Z ide of the ET were seen (two 
divots were forward of the bipod and one wa forward of the L02 feedline) . 
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Figure 2.4.1 (B) L02 Umbilical 
Two of the five lightning contact trips (12 and 8 o'clock positions) on the 
ET/Orbiter L02 umbilical interface plate were seen to be mi sing (1). Mis ing 
lightning contact trip have been previously seen (as recently as STS-78) and are 
the ubject of an in-flight anomaly (IFA). A separate object (possibly RTV purge 
barrier material) appeared to be partially detached at the 2 o'clock position of the 
L02 umbilical (2). A detached piece of insulation material (TPS) was seen at the 
forward right corner of the L02 umbilical (3) . TPS surface era ion/divots were 
noted on vertical section of the L02 electric cable tray(4). Typical erosion or 
chipping of the TPS on an aft L02 feedline flange wa noted. A mall light-colored 
tring-shaped piece of debris was visible near the ET aft dome on frame 21. 
The new TPS agent 24-57 was used on the STS-80 (ET 80) hydrogen (H2) tank aft 
dome. Multiple faint, light-colored marks are visible on the charred H2 tank aft 
dome TPS (5). Blistering of the LH2 ET/Orbiter umbilical fire barrier coating was 
typical. 
A piece of debri (dark on one side and light colored on the other ide) was seen 
near the LH2 electric cable tray. A large appearing, dark colored, omewhat 
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rectangular shaped piece of debris was seen corning from behind the electric cable 
tray (5mm lens, frame 676). An irregular shaped piece of debris was seen during 
SRB separation (5mm lens, frame 1170). 
Numerous light colored pieces of debris (probably insulation and frozen 
hydrogen) were seen though out the ET separation sequence on the 16mm films. 
Vapor and multiple light colored pieces of debris were seen after the umbilical 
separation. White debris (frozen hydrogen) were seen striking the forward 
surface of the LH2 electric cable tray (5mm lens, frames 3239 and 4856). No 
damage to the cable tray was detected. A large appearing piece of debris (white-
colored o~ one side and dark colored on the other side) was seen traveling in the -
Y direction in front of the LH2 umbilical after ET separation. 
No anomalies were noted on the face of the LH2 umbilical after ET separation (the 
LH2 umbilical interface plate appeared similar to previous mission views). As 
typically seen on previous missions, frozen hydrogen was noted on the orifice of 
the LH2 17 inch connect. Normal bum scars were seen on the ET near the 
forward SRB attach points and the forward bipod. 
Good coverage of the LSRB separation was acquired. As on previous missions, 
numerous light-colored pieces of debris (probably insulation) and dark debris 
(probably charred insulation) were seen throughout the SRB film sequence. 
Typical ablation and charring of the ET/Orbiter LH2 umbilical electric cable tray 
and the aft surface of horizontal section of the -YET ISRB vertical strut were seen. 
2.4.2 Analysis of Handheld Photography of the ET (Task #3) 
One roll of handheld photography was taken using the Nikon F4 with the 300 mm 
lens plus 2X extender. An early OMS-2 pitch maneuver was performed to bring 
the external tank into view. Nine frames were acquired during a two minute and 
twenty-nine second time period. 
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Figure 2.4.2 (A) Handheld View Of The External Tank 
As can be seen above, back-lighting from the sun degraded the handheld views of 
the external tank. The previou ly used foam-covered in tertank acce s door was 
flown on STS-80 (ET 80). The condi tion of the intertank acces door could not 
be determined due to the poor lighting conditions . 
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STS-80 ET/Orbiter Separation 
(4.5 m/s) 
1.28 ~------------------------------------------------------~ 
1 .26 
1 .24 
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E 
:. 1 . 20 
" u c 
! 1. 18 
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c 
1.16 
1.14 
1.12 
1 . 10 ~------~--------~--------~------------------~------~ 
14:59 15:07 15 :16 15 :24 
Time (MET) 
Figure 2.4.2 (B) ET Separation Velocity 
15 :33 15:42 
The distance of the external tank was calculated over a six-frame sequence using 
the handheld photography. The external tank was calculated to be a distance of 
1.1 km away from the Orbiter at 15:08 MET. The tank was calculated 31 seconds 
later (1 5:39 MET) to be at a distance of 1.3 lan. The tank separation velocity was 
detennined to be 4.6 mls. The separation velocity was similar to previous mission 
measurements. The tank tumble and roll rates could not be determined due to the 
poor lighting conditions. 
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2.S ON ORBIT EVENTS 
2.S.1 Video Analysi of STS-80 Airlock Mechanism 
Figure 2.5 .1 Airlock Hatch (Ex terior) 
Annotation 1 Handle attached to gear box mechanism 
Annotation 2 Latch #2 
Annotation 3 Latch #3 
Annotation 4 Latch #4 
Annotation 5 Latch #5 
Annotation 6 Latch #6 
Annotation 7 Starboard deployable leg 
Annotation 8 Port deployable leg 
To assist in the investigation of the STS-80 airlock hatch anomaly , the SN5 Image 
Science and Analysis Group provided information on four requested tasks to the 
Space Shuttle Program based on th analysis of down-linked video: 
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Request (1) Determine the orientation of the six hatch latches for the fully latched 
position of the actuator handle relative to the "jammed" position. 
The orientation of each latch link was measured relative to the deflection angle of 
each latch link using close-up views from video acquired with the end-effector 
camera positioned approximately face-on to each latch link (Figure 2.5.1, 
annotations 2-6). The total rotation of a latch link from fully latched to its dead-
on-center (DOC) perpendicular orientation was approximately 2.15 degrees. At 
the maximum jammed position, latches 1,2,3, and 4 were definitively observed 
to rotate beyond DOC in the unlatched direction (total rotations from fully latched 
of 5.5,4.9,5.8 and 7.5 degrees respectively). Latches 5 and 6 were observed to 
probably rotate beyond DOC in the unlatched direction, but the observations were 
not definitive due to uncertainty in the measurements. 
Request (2) Determine the relative times that the six latches reached their 
jammed positions. 
Video of the hatch that provided coverage of all six latches simultaneously during 
deflection of the actuator handle was not available. Therefore request 2 was not 
accomplished. 
Request (3) Determine the relativ~ times that the two deployable legs reached 
their jammed positions. 
Video of the simultaneous motion of both deployable legs was analyzed (Figure 
2.5.1, annotations 7 and 8). Both legs reached their jammed position within one 
video frame of each other, corresponding to a time difference of less than 
approximately 0.03 seconds. The starboard leg reached its jammed position first. 
Request (4) An inspection of the starboard deployable leg mechanism for 
evidence of debris. 
Close-up views of the starboard deployable leg mechanism were inspected for 
evidence of debris, in support of the "smart bolt" theory as the cause of the 
jamming. Six separate video segments were inspected. No evidence of debris 
was seen. 
During the post-flight inspection conducted by engineers at KSC, a loose screw 
was found lodged in the actuator gearbox (Figure 2.5.1 , annotation #1). This 
loose screw jammed the handle preventing the crew from opening the hatch on 
orbit. 
STS-80 JSC Summary Report A22 
2. Summary of Significant Events 
2.5.2 Orbiter Window Pitting 
A D2 copy of the video tape of the pitting seen on the Orbiter left hand overhead 
window (#8) was requested from the Imagery and Publications Office / BT4. The 
video of the pitting was screened, however, the Moir reported that no imagery 
analysis was required. 
2.6 LANDING EVENTS 
2.6.1 Landing S.ink Rate Analysis (Task #1) 
Video camera SLF-South was used to determine the landing sink rate of the main 
gear (film cameras did not provide adequate views of the main gear sink rate) . 
Landing film E7 was used to determine the nose gear sink rate. The sink rates of 
the Orbiter were determined over a one-second time period prior to main and nose 
gear touchdown. 
The measured main gear sink rate values were found to be below the maximum 
allowable values of 9.6 ftlsec for a 211,000 lb. vehicle and 6.0 ftlsec for a 240,000 
lb. vehicle (the landing weight of the STS-80 Orbiter was reported to be 227,523 
lb.). The sink rate measurements for STS-80 are given in Table 2.6.1. In Figure 
2.6.1(A), and 2.6.1(B), the trend of the measured data points for the image data is 
illustrated. 
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Table 2.6.1 Sink Rate Measurements 
STS-80 Main Gear Landing Sink Rate 
(Camera SLF South) 
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I , 
== 0 
"> 
+-__ ~ __ -+ ____ +-__ ~ __ -+ ____ +-__ ~ __ -+ ____ r-l ~ 
- 1 -0.9 -0.8 -0.7 -0.6 -0.5 -0.4 -0.3 -0.2 -0.1 0 
Time relative to nose gear touchdown (seconds) 
---height ---trend LOs - - - trend 0.5s - - -trend 0.255 I 
Figure 2.6.1 (A) Main Gear Height Versus Time Prior To Touchdown (Video) 
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.Figure 2.6.1 (B) Nose Gear Height Versus Time Prior To Touchdown (Film) 
2.7 OTHER 
2.7.1 Normal Events: 
Other normal events observed include: ice and vapor from the ET/Orbiter 
umbilical areas from SSME ignition through liftoff, inboard and outboard elevon 
motion at SSME ignition, ReS paper debris during SSME ignition through liftoff, 
ET twang, multiple pieces of light-colored debris falling from the LH2 and L02 
TSM T -0 umbilicals prior to and at disconnect, ET aft dome outgassing and vapor 
off the SRB stiffener rings during liftoff, vapor and ice from the GUCP area 
during ET GH2 vent arm retraction, slight left OMS nozzle vibration at SRB 
ignition, debris in the exhaust cloud after liftoff, expansion waves after liftoff, 
roll maneuver, slight body flap motion, linear optical effects, condensation around 
the launch vehicle after the roll maneuver, ET aft dome charring, recirculation, 
SRB plume brightening prior to SRB separation, SRB separation, and SRB slag 
material in the SRB exhaust plume before, during, and after SRB separation. 
2.7.2 Normal Pad Events Observed Were: 
Hydrogen bum ignitor operation, FSS deluge water operation, GH2 vent arm 
retraction, LH2 and L02 TSM door closure, MLP deluge water operation, and 
sound suppression system water operation. 
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APPENDIX B. MSFC PHOTOGRAPHIC ANALYSIS SUMMARY 
B 
Reply to Attn of: 
• 
National Aeronautics and 
Space Administration 
George C. Marshall Space Flight Center 
Marshall Space Flight Center, AL 3581 2 
EP42 (97-02) 
TO: Distribution 
FROM: EP42/Thomas J. Rieckhoff 
January 5, 1997 
SUBJECT: Engineering Photographic Analysis Report for STS-80 
The launch of space shuttle mission STS~80, the twenty-
first flight of the Orbiter Columbia occurred on November 19, 
1996, at approximately 1:55 P.M. Central Standard Time from 
Launch Complex 39B (LC-39B), Kennedy Space Center (KSC), 
Florida. Photographic and video coverage was evaluated to 
determine proper operation of the MSFC related flight hardware. 
Film was received from forty-three cameras as well as video 
from twenty-four requested cameras. The afternoon launch 
provided good lighting conditions for the engineering 
photography of STS-80 launch. Clouds partially obscured the 
views from several tracking cameras. Tracking cameras E204 and 
E222 were out of focus. The film from perimeter camera E60 was 
fogged and not shipped to MSFC. Short-range tracking camera E59 
experienced a short run. Water droplets on several MLP camera 
exposure lens ports reduced the image resolution prior to and 
during liftoff. 
Approximately one minute of ET video after separation was 
recorded by the astronauts and downlinked. This imagery is 
backlighted by the sun and provided little detail on the ET TPS 
conc ~tion. Nine images of the ET were recorded by the 
astronauts using a 35rnm camera. These images were also strongly 
backlighted by the sun. The 16mrn motion picture cameras and 
35rnm still camera in the orbiter's umbilical wells provided good 
coverage of the SRB and ET separation events as well as the ET 
TPS condition. 
Holddown post M-7 experienced a stud hang-up. This event 
is similar to previous hangs where the stud remains fully 
extended until the vehicle clears the stud. The stud then falls 
back into the catch mechanism. No explosive bolt debris was 
noted corning from the containment system. 
A greater than usual amount of ice/frost was noted around 
the GUCP. No damage to the TPS was noted. 
81 
Frost was noted around the SSME #2 eyelid prior to liftoff. This frost has been noted on 
previous missions. 
Orange flames were observed on the outside ofME-2 nozzle (-Z) during engine start 
near the #9 hatband. These flames were visible for approximately one second starting at 
19:55 :44.5 UTC. 
A piece of debris was seen to fall from the right ET/SRB lower attach strut (EB-8) at 
57:19:56:00.678 UTC. Other white glowing debris which is typical of what has been seen on 
other missions was observed originating from the RSRB plume. 
Flow recirculation was evident on this mission as recorded by the long-range tracking 
cameras. This event is typical of every shuttle launch and was visually enhanced by the clear 
sky conditions. The amount of recirculation appears to be typical of previous missions. 
A small portion of TPS was missing on the vertical strut at the aft orbiterlET (EO-2) 
attachment as recorded by the on-board LH2 wnbilical well camera. This missing TPS was fIrst 
observed when the camera began operation just prior to SRB separation. 
An unusually large piece ofTPS foam was observed traveling from right to left in the 
LH2 umbilical well camera' s fIeld-of-view after separation. The shape of the foam piece 
suggests that the source may be from the L02 disconnect. 
A small portion of TPS was noted missing on the diagonal strut near the L02 disconnect 
in the L02 umbilical well35mm camera fIlm. "Popcorning" of the LH2 tank aft dome TPS is 
also apparent. 
Two divots were observed in the +Z region of the intertank on the L02 wnbilical well 
35mm camera fIlm. One divot is located forward of the L02 feedline fairing and the other 
forward of the bipod strut. The divots ' linear shapes are aligned along the stringers and the 
metal primer appears visible. Divots of this type have been observed before. 
The following event times were acquired. 
EVENT 
M-1 PIC Firing 
M-2 PIC Firing 
M-5 PIC Firing 
M-6 PIC Firing 
SRB separation 
TIME CUT C) 
19:55:46.998 
19:55:46.998 
19:55:46.996 
19:55:46.999 
19:57 :51.0 I 
DATA SOURCE 
CameraE-9 
CameraE-8 
CameraE-12 
Camera E-13 
Camera E-208 
This report and additional information are available on the World Wide Web at URL: 
http://phot04.msfc.nasa.gov/STS/sts80/sts80.htrnl. 
B2 
-- -- ~- ~~-- --
For further information concerning this report contact Tom 
Rieckhoff at 544-7677 or Jeff Hixson, Boeing North American at 
971-3082. 
~ Tt,~ J . Rie 
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